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SITUATION

II.

DECLARATION OF \VAR .

The relations bet\veen the United States and State X
are strained. The United States issues an ultimatum on
July 1 to the effect that, if certain demands are not satisfied before July 10, \var \vill exist from that date.
State X breaks off diplomatic relations \vith the United
States on July 3 and announces that unless the demands
of the United States are \vithdra\vn before July 7 war \vill
be declared on that date.
On July 8 a \var vessel of the United States \vhose commander kno\vs only that neither the United States nor
State X has withdra\vn its demands meets a merchant
vessel of State Y \Vhich in case of \var \vould be neutral.
This vessel is kno\vn to be loaded with coal and is bound
for a port of State X \Vhich, besides being a large commercial port, also contains a naval station.
What action ~hould the commander take?
SOLUTION.

Unless exempt by treaty or other\vise the commander
should sen~ the merchant vessel of State Y to a prize
court on the ground that the cargo \Vas contraband of \var
if the vessel sailed with knowledge of the existence of the
\var.
If the vessel clearly had no knowledge of the existence
of the \Var, he should consider that .the cargo \viii probably
be liable to expropriation rather than condemnation.
NOTES.

H istorical.-I t was in early times considered necessary that there should be some formal declaration of
\Var. It \vas thought that a \var should not be begun by
\Vhat \Vithout State authorization might be regarded
simply as a violent act of an individual. It \Vas considered atone time that to commit an act of hostility before
a public decla~ation of \var \vould be perfidious.
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It ,\~ a s the opinion in the eighteenth century that the
State against "~hich the ,\~ar ,\~as to be 'Ynged and other
States ,\~ere entitled to den1n1Hl that they be informed by
a declaration of the purpose of a State to engage in "'\\~ar.
1'he Ron1an idea of a bellum _iustu1n inYolYed a previous
declaration. 'J'he cere1nony of declaration ,\~as, ho'\~ever,
a religious one and n1ny haYe been rather to justify the
"'\\.. ar before the gods than before 1nen.
'The chivalry of the Inidclle ages den1a1Hled a preYious
declaration and this " .. as frequently for1nnlly carried to
the ruler against ,\~ho1n the hostilities ,\~ere to be "~aged.
Such "'\\'"as the practice in the early part of the se,.. enteenth
century.
Grotius says that not onl~.. n1ust a "'\Ynr to be just be
'\\.,.aged by· the sovereign authority, but it n1ust be duly and
for1nally declared. He distinguishes a1nong "'\\~ars allO"'\\.._
ing "'\\~ars '\'"ithout declaration for the recoYery of a State's
O,\. n propert~~ or to ,\. ard off danger. lie, hO"'\\TeYer,
1naintains that in order to obtain the adYantages fio,\. ing
from the la"'\\'" of nations a declaration of "'\\. ar by one of the
parties if not by both is essential. His treatise provides
for the eondi tiona} declaration of "'\\'"ar "Then it is conjoined
"'\vith a de1nand for restitution. (De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
Lib. III, cap. III.)
Bynkershoek in the earl~.. eighteenth century regarded
declaration as the honorable n1ethod of entering on "Tar,
but not as absolutely essential, and before his period it
had become more and 1nore con1n1on for States to go to
"'\\.,.ar without declaration. During the eighteenth century
and the early ninteenth century the practice of declaration declined, and it ,\~as not till the latter half of the
nine teen th century that there arose a n1ove1nen t in favor
of declara t.ion.
~Iaurice, in his book on "I-Iostilities "'\Yithout Declaration
of \Yar," covers the period bet\\. een 1700 and 1870. Of
111 "'\\'" ars during this period he finds four forn1al declarations. Eleven declarations see1n to have been made
either forn1ally or infor1nally. In some instances diplomatic relations W'"ere broken ofi or so1ne action involving
an ultin1atu1n "'\\'"US taken. A large ntnnber, perhaps
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forty, seem to have been begun 'vithout declaration in
order to take the enemy by surprise.
Since 1870 there have been thirty or more cases 'vhere
States have resorted to arms. Some of these hostilities
hardly deserve the dignity of the classification as 'vars.
Domestic revolutions have often begun 'vithout declaration. The list includes:
Peruvian revolution, 1872.
Carlist revolution, Spain, 1873.
Balkan \Var, 1876.
Russo-Turkish \Var, 1877.
Afghan \Var, 1879.
Colombian revolution, 1879.
Chile-Peru-Bolivian \Yar, 1879.
Anglo-Boer \Var, 1880.
Franco-Tunis campaign, 1881.
Egyptian campaign, 1882.
Haitian revolution, 1882.
Tonquin campaign, 1882.
Haitian revolution, 1883.
Franco-Chinese \Var, 1884.
Servia-Bulgarian \Var, 1885.
Burmese \Var, 1885.

Haitian revolution, 1888.
Argentine revolution, 1890.
Chilean revolution, 1891.
Brazilian revolution, 1891.
Venezuelan revolution, 1892.
Ha·waiian revolution, 1893.
British-African \Yar, 1893.
Chino-Japanese \Var, 1894.
Italian-Abysinnian \Yar, 1894.
Cuban revolution, 1895.
Greco-Turkish \Yar, 1897.
Spanish-American \Yar, 1898.
South African \Yar, 1899.
German-African \Yar, 1903.
Russo-Japanese \Yar, 1904.

Of these, hostilities consequent upon internal revolutions 'vould ordinarily not be declared nor 'vould hostilities upon uncivilized tribes. But of the entire list there
were only nine declarations, of 'vhich five might be considered preliminary.
Before 1907 post facto declarations 'vere common; even
the United States Congress, 'vith 'vhich rests the po,ver
to declare 'var, declared on April25, 1898, ''that 'var exists
and that 'var has existed since the 21st day of April, A. D.
1898, including said day, bet,veen the United States of
America and the l{ingdom of Spain."
From this revie'v of more than t'vo hundred years it is
evident that preliminary declarations 'vere rarely issued
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Reasons for a declaration of war.-lf 'var 'vere simply a
fact without legal consequences, there might be reasons
'vhy a declaration should not be regarded as necessary
in all cases. vVar gives rise to certain legal consequences.
The relations of citizens of ·the belligerent States to one
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another are changed. The relations of citizens of belligerent and of neutral States are changed. The relations
and obligations of the neutral States and of citizens of
neutral States to the belligerents are changed. The neutral State is bound to prohibit certain actions ordinarily
permitted. The citizen of a neutral State is liable to
treabnent "·h.ich in ti1ne of peace 'vould not be tolerated .
. A. neutral State in tin1e of 'var n1ay not sell arms to a
belligerent State. ...A. neutral n1erchant Yessel in tin1e of
\Yar 1nust tolerate Yisit and search and other restrictions
upon her freedon1.
The custom deYeloped during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of dating the beginning of 'var fron1 the
date of the first act of hostilities, but in practice that
'vas not easy to determine. The courts of different States
have giYen different interpretations to the phrase "first
act of hostilities.:~ Indeed, the courts of one State have
at different periods and in different cases given different
interpretations to the phrase. \ Yl1en ''"'ars 'vere mainly
upon land and the interests and "·ell-being of States not
concerned in the hostilities 'vere not greatly affected the
necessity of a declaration of the tin1e at \vhich \Yar
existed or 'vould exist "·as not so essential.
J.lforal obligation to declare war.-Prof. \\Testlake sets
forth the moral obligation to make a declaration:
The war.s between the continental power.s in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were often commenced in fact before their declaration, and were sometimes carried through without any declaration,
quite as a matter of course, without that confused reference to reprisals
as a distinct institution, which helped to warp the thoughts and the
conduct of the maritime power.s. Thus on all sides the habit arose of
regarding lawful war-that is, war with all its legal effects, as commenced no less by fact than by declaration, and dating it from the
commencement of hostilities. By that term, if we try to put a definite
meaning on it, ''e must understand the fir.st act of force done with the
intent of war and not with that of reprisals or pacific blockade, or the
fir~t act of force done with the intent of reprisals or pacific blockade if
a war follows, or the fir.:3t act of force done with whatever intent-selfdefense, seizing what is called a Inaterial guarantee, or any otherwhich the State affected by it chooses to regard as one of war. Nor is
it possible to refuse its legal effects to a state of war so entered on or to
date ite eommeneem(,llt as between the partie.s otherwise. But from
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the point of view of political morality it can not be too strongly maintained that so serious a step as the entrance on a state of war ought
not to be taken without the deliberation for which the only security
-approaching to adequacy is the necessity of expression. No power
<Ioing an act of force with the intent of war, nor any power treating as
war an act of force done by another, is morally justified in omitting to
accompany its conduct by some kind of declaration. Nor again is any
power doing an act of force morally justified in not having a clear view
whether it intends it as war or not. If an act of force affects third
powers and they submit to it, deeming at the same time that it places
them in the position of neutrals in war with neutral rights and duties,
they can scarcely a void stating the view which they take of the situ a·
tion. (International Law, Part II, \Yar, p. 22.)

Hague Convention, opening of hostilities.-The Second
Hague Conference proposed and adopted a Convention
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. The Convention
was ratified by the United. States ~1arch 10, 1908.
The official French text is as follo,vs:
ART. 1. Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que
Zes hostilites entre elles ne doivent pas commencer sans un
avertissement prealable et non equivoque, qui aura, soit la
forme d'une declaration de g,uerre motivee, soit celle d'un
ultimatum avec declaration de guerre conditionnelle.
ART. 2. L' etat de guerre devra etre notifie sans retard aux
Puissances neutres et ne produira effet leur egard qu' a pres
reception d'une notification qui pourra etre faite meme par
iJoie telegraphique. Toutefois les Puissances neutres ne
pourraient invoquer l' absence de notification, s'il etait etabli
d'une maniere non douteuse qu' en fa.it elles connaissaient
Z' etat de guerre.
Article 1 is as proposed by the French delegation at the
Hague Conference of 1907 at the session of the second
commission on June 22, 1907. This proposition 'vas sec-onded by the Belgian delegation. The Belgian delegate
pointed out the uncertainty of practice and opinion as to.
the necessity of a declaration of 'va~ before engaging in
hostilities. The Netherlands delegate said, in the discussion before the second subcommission, on July 5, 1907:

a

II. ''Convient-il "-est demande ensuite-" que l'ouverture des hostilites soit precedee d'une declaration de guene ou d'un acte equivalent?"
70387-11-4
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Xotre point de YUe en cet egard est le meme que l'Institut de droit
international a exprime dans sa session de Gand au 1nois de septembre
de l'annee passee.
Il est conforme aux exigences de l'esprit du droit international
moderne, a la loyaute que les nations se doivent dans leurs rapports mutuels, ainsi qu'a l'interet commun de tousles Etats que les hostilites ne
puissent con1mencer sans un avertissement prealable et non equivoque.
Pourquoi? Pour des raisons qui, selon moi, se trouvent sous la main.
On demande le desarmement. Pourquoi done, ne commencerionsnous pas par ce qui est tres-facilement a atteindre? Si cela ne mene pas
diref'tement et ostensiblement au but voulu, du moins cela contribuera..
indirectement :\ ce que les Etats n'aient pas autant besoin de rester
armes en temps de paix, pour ne pas etre pris a l'improviste.
De plus, pour tant de relations commerciales qui de nos jours se sont.
developpees si extraordinairement, il importe que le moment ou la
guerre, qui bouleverse et change tout, a commence, soit fixe et puisse
etre determine exactement.
III. A la troisieme question: "Convient-il de fixer un delai qui
devra s'ecouler entre la notification d'un tel acte et l'ouverture des:
hostilites?" rna reponse est encore affirmative.
C'est pour cette raison que je me suis permis d'amender la proposition
de la Delegation franc;aise avec laquelle je suis au reste d'accord.
Il me semble que dans une matiere d'aussi grande importance que
celle qui nous occupe, il est desirable de preciser et d'eviter les terme&
vagues.
Or, si l'on ne precise pas ce que l'on desire et veut atteindre avec le·
terme m:ertissement prealable, cet avertissement en peut etre un, envoye
a l'adversaire une heure, meme une demie-heure ou moins encoreavant que les soldats passent la frontiere. Il va sans dire que le prealable:
ne sert alors a rien.
Veut-on ecarter les surprises, desire-t-on prevenir que l'avertissement ne devienne a cet egard qu'une simple forme, aime-t-on a contribuer au tranquille developpement des relations pacifiques des.
peuples, alors il faut fixer un delai et mettre au moins un intervalle de
24 heures, et, comme il me semble que c'est bien le moindre qu'on
puisse donner, j'aurai l'honneur de le proposer. (Deuxieme ConferenceInternationale de la Paix, Tome III, p 166.)

The Comite d' Examen, 'vhich considered the proposed
rules, reported that the question of opening of hostilities
w"ithout declaration had often led to recriminations on the
part of the belligerents; that it 'vas certainly expedient.
that there be some definite regulation. The t'vo propositions 'vere from France and the Netherlands, France
proposing that there be a declaration prior to hostilities
and the Netherlands that there be in addition a delay of
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24 hours. It " Tas decided that there ought to be a preYious unequivocal declaration before the co1nmencement
of hostilities.
In the '\Tords of the Go mite d' ExamenLa disposition principale, inspiree par une resolution de l'Institut de
droit international (Session de Gand, septembre 1906), se justifie aisement. Elle prevoit deux cas distincts. Une difficulte surgit entre
deux Etats: elle donnera ordinairement lieu a des negociations diplomatiques plus ou moins longues dans lesquelles chaque partie cherche
a faire reconnaltre ses pretentious ou tout au moins a obtenir une satisfaction partielle. L'accord ne se realisant pas, l'une des Puissances
peut determiner dans un ultimatum les conditions qu'elle exige et
dont elle declare ne pas vouloir se departir en fixant un delai pour la
reponse et en declarant que, en !'absence de reponse satisfaisante, elle
recourra aux armes. Dans ce cas, il n'y a aucune surprise et aucune
equivoque. La Puissance a laquelle s'adresse un pareil ultimatum
peut se decider en connaissance de cause, satisfaire son adversaire ou se
preparer a combattre.
Le confiit peut surgir brusque1nent et une Puissance peut vouloir
recourir aux armes sans tenter ou prolonger des negociations diplomatiques jugees inutiles. Elle doit alors avertir directement son
adversaire de son intention et cet avertissement doit etre non equivoque.
Quand !'intention de recourir aux armes est forn1ulee conditionnellement dans un ultiinatuin, elle est forcement motivee, puisque la
guerre doit etre la consequence du refus des satisfactions demandees.
II n'en est pas necessairement ainsi quand !'intention de faire laguerre
est manifestee directe1nent et sans ultimatum anterieur. La proposition veut que !'intention soit aussi motivee dans ce cas. Un Gouvernement ne doit pas recourir a une resolution aussi extreme que laguerre
sans la moth·er. II faut que tout le monde, dans les deux pays qui
vont etre belligerants comme dans les pays neutres, sache pourquoi
1'on vase battre, afin qu'un jugement puisse etre porte sur la conduite
des deux adversaires. Sans doute, on ne saurait se faire !'illusion de
croire que les veritables causes de la guerre seront toujours indiquees;
mais la difficulte d'indiquer ces causes, la necessite de mettre en avant
des causes n'ayant rien de fonde ou en disproportion avec le fait meme
de laguerre, sont de nature a attirer !'attention des Puissances neutres
et a eclairer !'opinion publique.
L'avertissement doit etre prealable en ce sens qu'il doit preceder les
hostilites. S'ecoulera-t-il un certain temps entre la reception de
l'avertissement et l'ouverture des hostilites? La proposition fran<;aise
ne fixe aucun delai, ce qui implique que les hostilites peuvent comInencer des que l'avertisEement est parvenu a l'adversaire. La limitation de la guerre dans le ten1ps est ainsi moins nettement determinee
que dans le cas de !'ultimatum. La Delegation fran<;aise avait estimf.
que les necessites de laguerre mod~rne ne permettent pas de demander,
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a celui qui a la YO}onte d'attaquer, d'autres delais que CeUX qui SOnt
absolument indispensables pour que son advers\).ire sache que la force
va etre employee contre lui. (Ibid., Tome I, p. 132.)
Of the argun1ents in ·fayor of a delay of 24 hours the
Com ite said :
On ne saurait nier la force de ces raisons qui n'ont cependant pas
convaincu la majorite de la Sous-Commission. La fixation d'un delai
n'a pas paru conciliable avec les exigences militaires actuelles; c'est
., deja un progres que d'aYoir fair admettre la necessite d'un avertissen1ent prealable. Esperons que l'avenir permettra d'en realiser un
autre, mais n'allons pas trop vite. II est a remarquer que l' Institut de
droit international, dans la resolution a laquelle il a ete fait allusion
plus haut, n'a pas cru non plus pouvoir suggerer la fixation d'un delai,
bien que, dans cet ordre d'idees, une assemblee de jurisconsultes
puisse etre moins resen·ee qu'une assemblee de diplomates, de militaires et de marins. II s' est borne a dire ceci: "Les hostilites ne
pourront commencer qu'apres !'expiration d'un delai suffisant pour
que la re~e de l'avertisseme"nt prealable et non equivoque ne puisse
etre consideree comme eludee. (Ibid., Tome I, p. 133.)

The proposition made by the French delegation at
the Second Hague Conference in 1907, as said by the
Oomite d' Examen, \vas based upon the resolution of the
Institut de Droit International at Ghent in September,
1906, \vhich may be translated as follo~vs:
(1) It is in accordance with the requirements of international law,
and with the spirit of loyalty which nations owe to each other in their
mutual relations, as well as in the comn1on interest of all States, that
hostilities should not commence without previous and unequivocal
notice.
(2) This notice may take the form of a declaration of war pure and
simple, or that of an ultin1atu1n, duly notified to the adversary by the
State about to cmnmence war.
(3) Hostilities should not begin till after the expiry of a delay
sufficient to insure that the rule of previous and unequivocal notice
may not be considered as evaded. (Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 203.)

The Conference 'vas mainly concerned not "·ith the
historical aspects, but rather with the expediency of
introducing a regulation for the declaration of 'var. The
Dutch delegation introduced the proposition that hostilities should not co1nn1ence till 24 hours at least after
an unequivocal declaration.
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The Dutch proposition received the support of the
Russian delegate.
Le probleme d'un tel delai est etroitement lie avec la question du
rapport qui existe, dans chaque pays, entre les effectifs de paix et les
effectifs de guerre. C'est done, par consequent, une question de reduction de depenses plus ou moins considerable. Le temps n'est
peut-etre pas si eloigne ou nous pourrons distinguer entre les effectifs
et les preparations de guerre, que chaque pays, en pleine souverainete
de sa decision, juge conformes a sa situation politique et ceux qu'il
est oblige de maintenir, uniquement en vue de la necessite d'etre a
tout instant sur le qui-vive. En etablis3ant un certain delai entre la
rupture des relations de paix et le com1nencement des hostilites, nous
donnerions ~u 'pays le moyen, a qui le couvrait, de realiser certaines
economies pendant les periodes de paix. Ces economies seraient incontestablement bienfaisantes, de part et d'autre, et ne seraient pas sans
apporter une grande detente dans l'etat de la paix armee, detente
d'autant plus facile a accepter qu'elle ne toucherait en rien au droit
de chaque nation d'etablir ses armements et ses effectifs uniquement
d'apres ses propres vues et necessites.
Le delai dont il s'agit aurait encore un autre a vantage: il donnerait
aux Puissances amies et neutres un temps precieux que celles-ci
pourraient employer a faire des efforts de reconciliation, a persuader
les nations en litige de porter leurs differends meme ici devant' la;
Haute Cour d'arbitrage. :Mais, en parlant de delai, il ne nous faut pas
perdre de vue, cependant, les possibilites presentes. L'idee d'un delai
considerable n'est pas encore mure dans la conscience des peuples.
Peut-etre serait-il utile, par consequent, de ne pas aller dans nos
desirs trop loin; de ne pas depasser a l'heure actuelle les possibilites
reelles d'aujourd'hui. Bornons-nous done a accepter le delai de 24
heures propose par la Delegation des Pays-Bas. Laissons a demain
l' amvre de demain en exprimant seulement un voou pour l'avenir
d'un delai plus grand, plus bienfaisant. (Deuxieme Conference
Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 133.)

The discussions in the Conference resulted In agreement upon the following:
Art. 1. The Oontracting Powers recognize that hostilities
between them must not commence without a previous and
unequivocal notice which shall have either the _form of a
declaration of war with reasons or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.
Thus there 'vas established a rule requiring a declaration of war previous to the opening of hostilities, but not
fixing the time 'vhich should elapse bet,veen the decla-
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ration and the opening of operations. It "·as, ho,vever,
argued that neutra]s should not be held responsib]e until
notified of the existence of 'var.
The report of the conunittee particularly concerned
'vith the drafting of this Convention said:
D'apres l'article 2 de la proposition de la Delegation fran~aise, ''l'etat
de guerre devra etre notifie sans retard aux Puissances neutres." En
effet, la guerre ne modifie pas seulement les rapports entre les belligerants, elle infiue grave1nent sur la situation des Etats neutres et de
leurs ressortissants; il importe des lors qu'ils soient prevenus le plus
tot possible. Aujourd'hui, avec la divulgation rapide des nouvelles,
il n'est guere a supposer que l'on tarde beaucoup a connaitre dans le
moncle entier !'existence d'une guerre ayant eclat€ sur un point quelconque du globe et qu'un Etat puisse invoquer son ignorance de l'etat
de guerre pour se soustrai.Te a toute responsabilite. Mais, enfin, il peut
arriver que, malgre les telegraphes terrestres ou ~ous-marins et la
radiotelegraphie, la nouvelle ne parvienne. pas cl'elle-meme aux
interesses; il y a done des precautions a prendre. D'une part, la
Delegation de Belgique avait propose l'amendement suivant: "L'etat
de guerre det•ra etre notijie aux Puissances neutres. Cette notification, qui
pourra etre jaite m.bne par voie telegraphique, ne produira eifel aleur egard
que 48 heures apres sa reception." ( roz. III, Deux. Cmn., Annexe 21.)
D'autre part, la Delegation britannique, clans un article faisant partie
d 'une proposition sou mise a la Troisieme Commission et ren voye a
votre Sous-Conunission, disait: "Un Etat neutre n'est tenu de prendre .
des mesures pour preserver sa neutralite que lorsqu' il aura rer;u d'un des
belligerants un avis du commencement de la guerre." (Vol. III, Trois.
Cmn., Annexe 44. )
L'amendement beige, qui n'avait en vue que de mettre les Etats
neutres en mesure de re1nplir leurs obligations, mais qui, pris a la
lettre~ aurait pu etre interprete autrement, a ete modifie; meme SOliS
sa forme nouvelle, il n'a pas obtenu !'approbation de la Commission.
L'opinion qui a prevalu est qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de fixer de clelai.
L'idee Inaitresse est tres simple. Un Etat ne peut etre tenu de remplir
les devoirs de la neutralite que lorsqu'il connait l'etat de guerre qui
fait precisement naitre ces devoirs. Des qu'il en est informe, peu
importe par quel moyen, pourvu qu ' il n'y ait aucun cloute a cet egard,
il ne peut rien faire de contraire ala neutralite. Est-il en meme temps
tenu d'empecher les actes contraires ala neutralite qui pourraient etre
commis sur son territoire? L'obligation suppose la possibilite de la
remplir. Ce que l'on peut demander au Gouvernement neutre, c'est
de prendre sans retard les 1nesures necessaires. Le delai dans lequel
les. mesures pourront etre prises variera naturellement suivant les circonstances , l'etenclue du territoire, la facilit~ des cotnmunications.
Le delai de -18 heures qui etait propose pourrait etre, selon les cas, trap
long ou trap court. II n'y a pas a etablir de presomption legale de
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responsabilite ou d'irresponsabilite. C'est une question de fait qui le
plus souvent sera resolue assez aisement.
La Sous-Commission s'est done bornee aadopter la redaction suivante:
''L 'etat de guerre devra etre notifie sans retard aux puissances neutres et ne
produira effet aleur egard qu'apres reception d'une notification qui pourra
.etre faite meme par voie telegraphique."
Au Comite d'Examen, on a fait remarquer que la regie ainsi posee est
trop absolue, puisqu'elle supposerait qu'un Gouvernement neutre, qui,
par suite de telle ou telle circonstance, n'aurait pas re9u la notification
-prevue, mais qui cependant aurait, sans doute aucun, connu l'etat de
guerre, peut se degager de toute responsabilite a raison de ses actes, en se
fondant simplement sur !'absence de notification. L'essentiel n'est-il
-pas qu'un Gouvernement connaisse l'etat de guerre pour prendre les
mesures necessaires? La preuve estfacile dans le cas d'une notification;
s'il n'y a pas eu de notification, le belligerant qui se plaint d'une violation de neutralite doit prouver nettement que l'etat de guerre etait certainement connu dans le pays ou se sont passes les actes incrimines.
Apres discussion, la majorite du Comite a decide d'ajouter la phrase
-suivante:
'' Il est du reste entendu que les Puissances neutres ne pourraient invoquer
l'absence de notification s'il etait etabli d'une maniere non douteuse qu' en
fait elles connaissaient l' etat de guerre.''
Ce texte, accepte par la Commission, semble tenir suffisamment
compte des interets en presence. (Ibid., p. 134.)

With the substitution of the \vord "Toutefois" for the
clause "II est du reste entendu que" this formula \vas
adopted by the Conference.
Report oj American delegation.-The American delegates to the Second Hague Conference, in reporting to
the Secretary of State, said, regarding the Convention
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities:
The convention is very short, and is based upon the principle that
neither belligerent should be taken by surprise, and that the neutral
shall not be bound to the performance of neutral duties until it has
received notification, even if only by telegram, of the outbreak of war.
The means of notification is considered unimportant, for if the neutral
knows, through whatever means or whatever channels, of the existence
of war, it can not claim a formal notification from the belligerents
before being taxed with neutral obligations. 'Yhile the importance of
the convention to prospective belligerents may be open to doubt, it is
clear that it does safeguard in a very high degree the rights of neutrals,
and specifies authoritatively the exact moment when the duty of neutrality begins. It is for this reason that the American delegation supported the project and signed the convention. (60th Congress, 1st Se~s.,
S. Doc. 444, p. 34.)
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Com1nence1nent oj hostilities after declaration. - It is
recognized by this Hague Convention "that hostilities
betw·een Contracting Po,vers 1nust not cornmence 'vithout
previous and unequivocal notice. " 'fhe period of tirne
,v}{ich 1nust elapse is not prescribed, and the proposition to
1nake it at least 24 hours 'vas not accepted. Therefore,
in strict conformity 'vith the la'v of this Convention, the
declaration could be made at as short a time previous to
the opening of hostilities as suited the convenience of the
belligerent.
It is also evident that this Convention is operative only
arnong States 'vhich have beco1ne parties to it. (Before
1910 this Convention had been signed by all the States
represented at The Hague in 1907, except China and
Kicaragua.) The Convention being binding bet,veen
States only is not necessarily applicable in time of civil
w·ar or similar hostilities.
Prof. '¥estlake 1naintains that under certain circumstances the commencement of hostilities 'vithout a preceding declaration ''is left possible by the fact that the
parties are not made to contract that they will not comInence hostilities against one another otherwise than is
described, but recognize that hostilities ought not (ne
doivent pas) to be other,vise commenced." (International
La,v, Pt. II, War, p. 267.) If this interpretation of the
French is admitted, it is evident that the purpose of theConvention 'vas, as the preamble says, to prevent the
"commencement of hostilities without previous .notice.H
It \vould seen1, ho,vever, if the Convention has been signed
in good faith, as must be ackno,vledged, ne doivent pas~
becomes obligatory and lays a prohibition on the Contracting Po\vers to refra!n from commencement of hostilities till after notice or declaration.
A much 111ore difficult question arises 'vhen it is asked
'vhat constitutes the commencement of hostilities. It is
an undoubted fact that the first shot fired by order of
the State might be regarded as the opening of hostilities;
sirnilarly, a proclamation of blockade or other like act of
the State 1night be so regarded. The Constitution of the
U nited States provides that Congress shall have power
" to declare 'var." (Art. I, sec. 8, 11.)
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In case of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration
of war, the conditional provision gains importance.
Commencement of Spanish-American War.-In 1899
~.fr. Chief Justice Fuller said of the Spanish 1nerchant
steamer Pedro:
When, on the 22d day of April, this Spanish steamer sailed from
Havana, the United States and Spain were at war. Congress had
adopted a resolution, April 20, demanding "that the Government of
Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of
Cuba and withdraw its land 3.nd naval forces from Cuba and Cuban
waters," and directing and empowering the President "to use the
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the
actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to
such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect."
Time was given by the Executive until April 23 for Spain to signify
. compliance with the demand, but the Spanish Government at once, on
April 21, recognized the resolution as "an evident declaration of war,"
and diplomatic relations were broken off. Blockade had been proclaimed April 22, and put into effective operation at Havana, and,
immediately thereupon, elsewhere, under the proclamation. And by
the act of Congress of April25 it was declared that war had existed since
the"21st day of April. (The Pedro, 175 U. S. Supreme Court Reports,
'\
p. 354.)

This was ip accord \vith the general opinion in regard
to the relation of declaration of war to the opening of
hostilities as summarized by Prof. lVfoore in 1906.
It is universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary
to constitute a state of war. From this principle, however, an unnecessary and perhaps unwarranted inference is often drawn, namely, that
a nation may lawfully or properly begin a war at any time and under
any circumstances, :with or without notice, in its own absolute discretion. Such a theory would seem to be altogether inadmissible. Although a contest by force between nations may, no matter how it may
have been begun, constitute a state of war, it by no means follows that
nations, in precipitating such a condition of things, are not bound by
any principles of honor or good faith. If, for example, a nation, wishing
to absorb another, or to seize a part of its territory, should, without
warning or prior controversy, suddenly attack it, a state of war would
undoubtedly follow, but it could not be said that the principles of
honor and good faith enjoined by the law of nations had not been
violated. In other words, to admit that a state of war exists is by no
means to justify the mode by which it was brought about or begun.
Nor is the practice of fraud and deceit permitted by a state of war supposed to be admissible in time of peace. (7 :Moore, Internatinal Law
Digest, p. 171.)
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Co1nmencemerzt of Russo-Japanese lVar.-During the
Russo-Japanese ,.Var in 1904 the question arose as to
"·hat action really constituted the opening of hostilities.
In the case of the Russian steamship Argun 'vhich 'vas
captured on the 7th of February, 1904, at about 4 p. m.,
and condemned by the Sasebo Prize Court the plea 'vas
entered that the capture "·as made before the opening of
hostilities as follo\\·s:
(1) It is a rule in international law that the state of war begins with
the opening of actual hostilities. The ship under consideration was
captured on the day before the sea fight off Port Arthur; that is, before
the opening of actual hostilities. She ought, therefore, to be released.
(Takahashi, International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese \rar,
p. 574.)

Other pleas "·ere also entered against the legality of
the capture.
After due consideration the Court concludes as follows:
\Yhen diplomatic negotiations concerning the :Manchurian and
Korean questions were going on between Japan and Russia, the latter
country unreasonably failed to give her answer to Japan. On the
other hand, she showed great activity in her anny and navy, sent her
land forces to ~Ianchuria and Korea, collected her war vessels at Port
Arthur, and thus showed her determination to fight. This fact was
clear.
\\nereupon Japan, on the 5th of the second month of the thirtyseventh year of )Jeiji, notified Russia that all diplomatic relations
were at an end.
At the same time Japan made preparations for action and the next
day, the 6th, at 7 a.m., her fleet left Sasebo with the object of attacking
the Russian fleet. Inferring from the conduct of the navies of both
countries and from the state of things at the time, hostile operations
. were publicly opened prior to the capture of the steamship now under
consideration. And as it is thus clear that a state of war had begun
before the time of the ship's capture, there is no need to discuss whether
it was made before the declaration of war or not. (Ibid., p. 575.)

On protest against the decision of this Court, the
Higher Prize Court at Tokyo sustained the decision of
the prize court of first instance. The derision of the
Higher Prize Court is explained as follo\\·s:
In (1) of the protest the advocate argues that the state of war commences with the opening of actual hostilities, and as hostilities actually
opened between Japan and Russia on the 8th of the second month of
the thirty-seventh year of )leiji, the ship ought not be confiscated.
But the commencement of the state of war does not necessarily lie at
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the moment when two armed forces open fire upon each other, but
rather at the time when the intention of making war i~ made public;
that is to say, at the time when such intention is carried into effect,or
when by a declaration of war or otherwise any such notification is n1ade.
And as the intention of making war had been publicly announced on
the 6th of the second month of the thirty-seventh year of l\leiji, before
the battle was fought at Port Arthur on the 8th, the state of war already
existed on the 7th; and the argument of the advocate that the war
commenced on the 8th has no ground. (Ibid., p. 577.)

In referring to the capture of the Russian \"'"olunteer
Fleet Company's steamship Ekaterinoslav "?hich 'vas
rnade about 9 o'clock on the morning of February 6,
1904, the Higher Prize Court said in regard to the protest
against the decision of the }o,ver CO\].rt:
The state of war does not necessarily begin at the n1on1ent when the
two opposing armed forces open fire upon each other, but rather wht>n
the intention of making war is made public; that is to ~ay, when the
intention is carried into action, or when a declaration of \Var or any
such notification is made. \\'hen diplomatic negotiations were going
on between Japan and Russia concerning the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, the Russian unreasonableness put
an amicable settlement beyond hope. And when it beca1ne very
clear that Russia intended to force Japan to submission by force of arms,
the Japanese Government ordered its diplomatic agent at St. Petersburg on the 5th dav of the 2d month of the 37th year of ~leiji to notify
the Russian Government that diplomatic relations between the two
countrie.; were at an end. At the same time the imperial fleet made
preparations for war and left Sasebo the next day, the 6th, at 7 a. m.,
with the object of opening hostilities. On the way the fleet captured
the ship under consideration, which was liable to naYal sen·ice in
time of war. This (i. e., the sailing of the fleet) was nothing more than
putting .the intention into action, and the Russo-Japanese \Yar n1u~t
be said to have been opened from that moment. Thus the state of war
existed on the 6th day of the 2d month of the 37th year ot l\leiji; that
is, the day on which the Japanese man-of-war Saiyen captured the
ship under consideration. (Ibid., p. 590.)

If this case had arisen subsequent to the agreernent
upon the Hague Convention of 1907 relatiYe to the
Commencement of Hostilities, in 'vhich ''the Contracting
Po,vers recognize that hostilities bet,veen then1 n1ust not
commence 'vithout a previous and unequivocal notice,''
the declaration should have preceded the departure of
the fleet from Sasebo at 7 a. 111. on the lllOrning of February 6, 1904.
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If the ~ailing of a fleet ""·ith the object of opening hostilities" constitutes a state of w·ar, there Inay be consequences of far-reaching significance to naval po,vers in
this Hague Convention. If the Russo-Japanese troubles
had been deferred till 1908 and a Russian fleet had sailed
fron1 St. Petersburg "·ith the intention of attacking the
Japanese fleet at Sasebo, 'vould it have been necessary
in order that Russia 1night not be accused of bad faith that
the Russian authorities should have made a previous
declaration of w·ar, thus giving to Japan the advantage
of "reeks of preparation~
If the sailing of the Russian fleet, as above, constituted a
state of "·ar, Russia, by Article 2 of the Hague Convention
"·ould have been under obligation to notify "neutral
Po,vers "·ithout delay;" other,vise such Po"·ers n1ight be
subjeet to the necessity of proving that they "·ere una\vare
of the state of \Var .
. A.fter considering cases Prof. Takahashi says, "On the
" . hole, the author's vie\v is that the Russo-Japanese \Yar
"·as con1menced by the capture of the Ekaterinoslav, as
she "'"as liable to be appropriated for naval service during
the "·ar." (Ibid, p. 25.)
';Vhile the Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities \Vould probably give rise to few·, if any, questions
in case of \Yar on land, it \Yould seen1 necessary to deterInine \vhat constitutes the conunence1nent of hostilities .,
upon the sea in order that the contracting po,vers Inay
not be accused of bad faith.
Application of principles to Si.tuation 11.-In spite of the
previous ultimatum of the United States, it ",.ould seen1
that the United States could consider that a state of "·ar
exists ·bet"·een July 7 and 10.
This situation is not expressly covered by the Hague
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities.
There is, ho"·ever, nothing in international la\v \Yhich
prevents State X fro1n issuing a subsequent ultin1atun1
to take effect at a date earlier than that named by the
C ni ted States.
Since State X has then the po"·er of declaring \var
against the Lnited States before July 10, it could hardly
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he consistently argued that the United States has tied
its O\vn hands from all offensive or defensive \Varfare
until July 10, if "Tar is declared by X before that date.
Reasons of fairness and of necessity den1and that "Te
find by implication in the United States ulti1natum an
intention of postponing \Var till July 10, if X does not
sooner declare war against the United States. If X declares
\Var prior to the lOth, then for the purposes of the United
States \var dates fron1 this prior date.
This same result is practically reached by Dr. Sto,vell
1
\Vhen he says in discussing an interval before the opening
of hostilities\Yhen one State declares war against another, giving an interval before the opening of hostilities, it goes without saying that the State
against which war is declared may in turn declare war at once, or it may
allow a shorter interval before the commencing of hostilities. But what
if it make no rejoinder-may it begin hostilities at the expiration of the .
interval? Yes; because if attacked it would certainly defend itself,
and the measures of defense necessary to its security must in some
instances go to the ·extent of attacking the declaring State. (American
Journal of Int. Law, vol. 2, Xo. 1, p. 56.)

E_ffect o.f the declarations o.f the United States and State
.LY.-Considering the Hague Convention of 1907 as operative unless there is evidence or a statement to the contrary, these declarations by the United States and State
X may be considered to be n1ade under the provisions of
the Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities.
In accordance \vith the ultimatun1 of the United States
\Var \vould exist fron1 July 10 unless certain de1nands are
satisfied before that date. These demands are not satisfied; therefore there \vould be no doubt as to the existence
of \var from July 10.
State X announces that \Var \viii be declared on July 7
unless the United States \vithdraws its de1nands before
that date.
These acts of the United.States and State X nuty properly be regarded as ulti1natums \Vith conditional declarations of \var conforming t.o the requireinents of the Hague
convention.
In order that \var nuty exist by declaration it is not
necessary that both parties should 1nake declaration.
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'Ynr n1a.y exist by declaration on one side. State X has
announced that it \Vould n1ake such a declaration for
July 7 if the United States did not take certain action.
'I'his action the United States did not take. ~ o statenlent is n1ade as to \vhether State X did, as it announced
it \vould do, declare \Var on July 7. Ho\vever, in the
absence of any "·ithclra.\val of the de1nand, it "\\,.ould be
legitiinate for the United States to consider the action of
State X as a declarati9n of \var and to regard a. state of,
\\·ar as existing fron1 July 7 in accord \\'"ith the announceInent of State X.
Attitude o_( the com,m and er.-The com1nander of the
l . . nited States \\·ar vessel kno\\·s only that the demands of
neither the United States nor of State X have been Inodified. l-Ie Inay accordingly regard a state of \var as existing bet,\·een the lTnited States and State X fron1 July 7.
It \\·ould be oi1ly in accord \\. ith proper interpretation of
the sta.ten1ent of State X to accept July 7 as the date of
the beginning of the \var. For the com1nander, therefore,
\var bet,veen the United States and State X \vould exist
on July 8, \vhen he meets the merchant vessel of State Y
loaded \vith coal and bound for a port of State X. He
\Vould first haYe to consider \vhat is the status of the coal
under the conditions and then must consider \vhat is the
status of the vessel under the conditions.
Status of the merchant vessel if sailing with knowledge of
1var.-lf the n1erchant vessel had sailed \v·ith kno\vledge
of the existence of \\'"ar bet\\'"een the United States a.nd
State X she \\'"Ould be liable to capture by the \Var vessel
of the United States as bound t"o a hostile destination
\\·ith a cargo w·hich under the conditions \Vould presumably be contraband. The evidence \vould certainly be
sufficient to justify the co1nmander in sending the vessel
to a prize court. In forming his decision to take such
action, he could be reasonably certain that he could act
\\'"ithout n1aking his State liable to damages if the merchant vessel kne\v of the existence of \var.
Status of the merchant vessel if sailing without knowledge
nf the 1.car.-If the merchant vessel had sailed before July
1 and had no knO\\·ledge of the prospect of hostilities, the
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vessel could not have sailed for a belligerent destination,
as at that time the port of State X 'vas not the port of a
belligerent. Accordingly the cargo would not at the
beginning of the voyage be contraband, but in the highest
degree innocent.
If the vessel had sailed after July 1 and before July 7
'vith a kno,vledge of the strained relations and of the action
of one or of both the States, it might be "\vithout guilty
intent, for the strained relations might not result in 'var,
as both declarations were conditional. The mechant
vessel of a neutral State Y could not be presumed to
kno'v 'vhether or not the conditions had been met.
Until July 7 the destination would be peaceful and cargo
innocent. If war existed from that date the destination
mig}.lt be belligerent, and t~e question would arise as to
·whether the cargo would be liable, as it would in case it
had been shipped for a belligerent destination. A neutral
ship is entitled to knowledge of the existence of blockade
before incurring any penalty. It would seem that a neutral vessel "\vould similarly be entitled to kno'v of the
existence of 'var before she would be liable for the carriage of contraband and before the articles of the nature
of contraband could be condemned as contraband. The
commander should therefore exercise more caution in
sending in such a vessel. It "rill also be expedient to have
regard to treaty provisions in respect to the treatment of
contraband. Such provisions as Article 10 of the treaty
of the United States 'vith S,veden of April 3, 1783, might
apply.
10. These which follow shall not be reckoned in the number of
prohibited goods-that is to say, all sorts of cloths and all other n1anufactures of wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other materials, all kinds of
wearing apparel, together with the things of which they are commonly
made; gold, silver, coined or uncoined, brass, iron, lead, copper,
latten, coals, wheat, barley, and all sorts of corn or pulse, tobacco, all
kinds of spices, salted and smoked flesh, salted fish, cheese, butter,
b~er, oyl, wines, sugar, all sorts of salt and provisions which serve for
the nourishment and sustenance of man; all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax,
tar, pitch, ropes, cables, sails, sailcloth, anchors, and any parts of
anchors, ship masts, planks, boards, beams, and all sorts of trees and
other things proper for building or repairing ships. Nor shall any
goods be considered as contraband which have not been worked into the
ART.

·
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fonn of any instrument or thing for the purpose of war by land or by sea,
much less such aA have been prepared or wrought up for any other use.
All which shall be reckoned free goods, as likewise all other, which
are not comprehended and particularly mentioned in the foregoing
article; so that they shall not, by any pretended interpretation, be conlprehended among prohibited or contraband goods. On the contrary,
they may be freely transported by the subjects of the King and of the
United States, even to places belonging to an enemy, such places only
excepted as are besieged, blocked, or invested, and those places only
shall be considered as such which are nearly surrounded by one of the
belligerent powers.

This treaty also contains in Article 15 a staten1ent in
regard to the liability of com1nanding officersAnd that more effectual care may be taken for the security of the two
contracting parties, that they suffer no prejudice by the men of war of
the other party or by privateers, all captains and commanders of ships
of His Swedish :Jiajesty and of the united States and all the.L· subjects
shall be forbidden to do any injury or damage to those of the other
party, and if they act to the contrary, having been found guilty on
exa1nination by their proper judges they shall be bound to make satisfaction for all damages and the interest thereof and to make them good
under pain and obligation of their persons and goods,

J.-Votification to neutrals of the existence of' war.-'fhere is
a provision in the Hague Convention of 1907 relative to
the Opening of Hostilities to the effect thatThe existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after
the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by tele
graph. Xeutral Powers, nevertheless, can not rely on the absence of
notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of
the existence of a stu te of war.
'

Prof.
Court:

~1oore

cites a report of the .A.rgentine -Supreme

In February, 1865, a British subject shipped from Liverpool to his
agent in Buenos Ayres a quantity of rifles, with a view to their sale in
Paraguay. After the arrival of the goods at Buenos Ayres such a sale
was negotiated, and the rifles were shipped from Buenos Ayres on
April 8, 1865, for Corrientes, Argentine Republic, where they were_ to
be transshipped for Paraguay. On April 14 war broke out_ between
the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, and the steamer on which the
rifles were transported was stopped by the governor of Corrientes, who
took out the rifles and placed then1 at the disposal of the Argentine
Governn1ent. The owner subsequently presented a claim for the
value of the rifles, as well as for an inden1nity of about a fourth of their
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value for their detention for 18 months. Their value he estimated by
the price which they would have fetched in Paraguay. A suit was
brought in the federal court at Buenos Ayres, which held that the
rifles could not be lawfully confiscated, and that they should be returned to the owner or that a just equivalent should be paid to him or
his representative. From this decision the Argentine Government
appealed to the supreme court, which decided that, as the arms were
shipped by the owner before the declaration of war, they were not
subject to confiscation; that their taking by the Argentine Republic
was to be considered as an act of expropriation for public usc, and not
as an act of preemption under the law of nations; that according to
the law of expropriation the price to be paid was what the goods were
worth in place where they were taken; and that, as the Government
had in detaining the arms exercised a legitimate right, from which no
obligation to pay indemnity could arise, the Government should pay
only the current rate of interest on the value of the arms from the date
of their expropriation. (7 :\Ioore Int. Law Digest, p. 747 .)

Resume.-From the conditions and regarding prin-.
ciples and international conventions and agreen1ents and
such precedents as may be applicable, it 'vould seem
that the merchant vessel of neutral State Y loaded with
coal should be treated 'vith caution if she had sailed
'vithout knowledge of the existence of war, as might
easily be the case if she \vas met on July 8, as stated in
the situation. According to the precedent from the
Argentine court the goods seized under such circumstances would be liable to expropriation rather than
condemnation as prize.
SOLUTION.

Unless exempt by treaty or otherwise the commander
should send the merchant vessel of State Y to a prize
court on the ground that the cargo 'vas contraband of
war if the vessel sailed 'vith knowledge of the existence
of the war.
If the vessel clearly had no knowledge of the existence
of the war, he should consider that the cargo will probably be liable to expropriation rather than condemnation.
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